[EAS] FCC DA 14-1626 and DA 14-1628

[Ed Czarnecki]

Several points:

(1) I very much agree that there needs to be a conversation about improving
the security of conventional FSK-based EAS.  And synching messages with
CAP-based EAS.  It is do-able (several interesting suggestions have been
fielded in this list) and other venues have knocked heads on the subject
(including the FCC's own CSRIC III and IV).  Doing things like modifying the
EAS header (or adding ancillary elements) - whether that be adding a year
parameter, extending JJHHMMM to and ISO-compliant format, adding a message
ID, authenticator, etc. could measurably enhance EAS system resilience.
Conventional EAS has a valuable role  - even irreplaceable role - especially
in post-event "really bad day" scenarios.

But it may also challenge the role of players like the NWS, which would be
challenged in changing their internal systems to product and consume such
modified EAS headers.  One small change can create major ripples in the
ecosystem.

(2) The evolution of IPAWS was complicated, and emerged from a number of
different directions.  Once upon a time, I was a subcontractor working on a
FEMA advanced (supplemental) EAS pilot project ... the much misunderstood
"DEAS" project.  In 2004, I got together with Art Botterell (then a PPW
member), and integrated the CAP format into the DEAS pilot project.
Introducing CAP into FEMA was probably the singular legacy of the DEAS
project (the progenitor of IPAWS).  So, this year marked the 10 year
anniversary of DEAS and first introduction of the Common Alerting Protocol
into a FEMA project.  Time flies!  I recall the cocktail reception where
Reynold Hoover first came up with the name IPAWS.  He sketched out a cat's
eye with a paw as a logo too.  Glad the name stuck, but not the logo idea.

By 2006, we were already converting CAP into EAS headers, and inserting
streaming audio (and video!) for an simulated EAN.  This was more than five
years *before* the ECIG CAP-EAS implementation guide, and over seven before
the FCC's 5th R&O adopting CAP.  The DEAS project had several major
limitations, but did showcase several things - first use of CAP XML
messaging, with audio and video payloads, conversion into EAS, relay over
satellite and wireless data systems, and ... at least a modest increased
level of security. 

(3) Reconstituting the Partnership for Public Warning has some merits.  If
not PPW, then a narrower scoped partnership.  One of the challenges with the
original PPW was focus ... and mission creep.  IMHO, it tried to be all
things to all people.  I also recall discussions that conflated public
information with public warning.  My formal affiliation with PPW was brief.
In March 2005, I convinced the company that I then worked for to join PPW.
In April or May 2005, I attended my first a PPW meeting as a member ... and
the top agenda item was the PPW board announcing they agreed to *disband*
PPW.  Oops...  Timing is everything, LOL.  

-----Original Message-----
From: eas-bounces at radiolists.net [mailto:eas-bounces at radiolists.net] On
Behalf Of Richard Rudman

Those of us who wrote the reports that the Partnership for Public Warning
(PPW) issued over ten years ago outlined a national warning system that had
all of the attributes Bill mentioned.

FEMA's name for their implementation of the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP)