[EAS] Dallas warning sirens hacked - maybe

[Sean Donelan]

On Sat, 8 Apr 2017, Ed Czarnecki wrote:
> The city is sticking to the story that it was a hacker (whether or not test
> mode was involved), and also infer that it was someone "in the Dallas area".
> In this case, the scenario involves a large 150+ siren system is managed by
> three control points (two in the same building), all of which set up to
> allow remote activation via the Internet ...  Which is the interesting part
> - these may have been attacked individually, or at a central control point.
> But the central control points apparently could not shut they sirens down
> once activated.

The original Massachusetts Institute of Technology meaning of the work 
"hack" is not limited to computer hacking.  But I don't know if the Dallas 
public information officials are being that sophisticated.

While Dallas officials aren't saying what happened, or whether other 
outdoor warning systems in other jurisdictions may have the same 
vulnerability; local journalists in Dallas are reporting city sources are 
telling them:

1. Officials know how it was done, but not who did it
2. Was not a malfunction or operator error by insiders
3. Local, physical access to the hub controlling the sirens (not 
remote/Internet hacking source)
4. Manual shutdown of the hub controlling the sirens to stop it

So it may not be a "computer hack."

The reporters or official sources may misunderstood what they've heard, so 
the news reports could be incorrect.  For example, last month Dallas 
officials blamed T-Mobile for problems with its 9-1-1 system. 
After the investigation, it turned out to be a problem with an old PBX 
and under-staffing at the city's 9-1-1 center.  T-Mobile was not the 
source of the 9-1-1 problems.

The report it was a local/physical attack is unusual, especially 
combined with the statement it wasn't an insider or operator error.
But those reports could be wrong.