[AF] Ha!

[Sid Schweiger]

>>I always thought that to change the Constitution it required that the designated process (see below) to be followed and not some "constitutional interpretation " as Sid wrote.  This is where the judges are failing us.  It is not a judge's right to re-interpret the constitution, but to make sure laws are enacted that follow the Constitution as written.<<

Only if you want a Constitution that goes on interminably and covers every situation that anyone has ever thought of.  There should be no reason for that except to cover situations that can't be remedied any other way (for example, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), that taxes on incomes were illegal, conflicting with the taxation clause in Article I; by 1913 the Sixteenth Amendment had been ratified).  Note also that amendments require an uphill climb (2/3 of both houses of Congress and 3/4 of the states), per the intent of the framers that everyone's pet projects and peeves don't necessarily warrant a change to the basic law of the land.

And, if it's not a "judge's right to re-interpret the Constitution," then the Supreme Court must overturn one of its earliest and most famous precedents, Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137, 1803), which establishes the principle of judicial review of the law and which was based on both the wording of Article III ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned [within the judicial power of the United States], the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.") and this portion of Federalist No. 78:

"If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It, therefore, belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents."