[EAS] Dallas warning sirens hacked - maybe

[Sean Donelan]

On Sun, 9 Apr 2017, Botterell, Arthur at CalOES wrote:
> This is why we included a Cancel message type in CAP.  Errors will 
> happen, both willful and witless.  I don't know whether it has to do 
> with the worshipful attitude we tend to take toward "official" 
> information and systems, or just an unwillingness to come to grips with 
> human and technical imperfection.

Murphy's Law can outsmart all the backup safety systems. Most of the time, 
only one or two sirens accidently (or maliciously) activate.

However, even a Cancel Message type won't help when the control system 
itself has an error or compromise. They may need dispatch a road crew to 
shut-off power to each siren manually.  That's easy for one or two sirens. 
Its takes a while when all 156 sirens across a texas-size city won't 
respond to central control systems.

The Hawaii Civil Defense Siren System had a similar problem when the 
system vendor accidently left it in "test mode" during maintenance, 
connected to the vendor's test system.  Later while the system vendor was 
testing a siren system in a different state, they kept activating the 
sirens in Hawaii.  Each time Hawaii turned off the sirens, the test system 
would re-activate the sirens.

Dallas happens to use the same system vendor as Hawaii for its outdoor 
warning sirens.  It maybe a hacker, or it may be the system vendor left 
the Dallas siren system in "test mode."