[EAS] Next Generation

[RobertM]

We just add layers of complexity that will not work in the end. Conelrad would never have worked if it were ever needed and was a knee jerk reaction to Pearl Harbor 10 years earlier. The Russians did not need RDF to find targets in 1951 and later. Secondly, there was no real civil defense plan or infrastructure so if Conelrad did work it would offer a message similar to " hide under your desk and kiss your ass goodbye". Things have not changed much, an unfunded mandate with no real backup plan. 


> On Nov 16, 2014, at 12:14 AM, Dale Lamm <dlamm at whbc.com> wrote:
> 
> Phil makes a good point about reaching out to wiser ones in order to implement better message security. The electronic red envelope is a great idea, assuming the authenticator word is lengthy enough to require many, many trials for a black hat to guess the correct one. AND if the delivery of the locally stored authenticator word occurs over a secure channel. Making it the payload of an RWT received from an off-air source is not necessarily secure.
> 
> The problem of secure, authenticity-guaranteed message delivery over wireless has been around since World War I. Many brilliant minds have made this their life's work.