[EAS] Next Generation

[Barry Mishkind]

At 01:30 PM 11/13/2014, Ed Czarnecki wrote:
>This would be a machine-to-machine transaction.  Most sites are unattended
>anyway.

        Quite so ... which is why literal envelopes are 
        not the answer. 

>Authenticity and non-repudiation are about solving "trust" problems.  Events
>like Bobby Bones have challenged the nation that stations can automatically
>"trust" the EAS they are receiving.  Adding digital measures to rebuild that
>trust (in the technical sense) are essential.

        As has been noted, there are quite a few examples
        of EAS on the YouTube and other places. There are
        even advice pages on how to "beat" EAS.

        Ed, can you tell us how simple/difficult it would be
        to add a place for downloading the "random" code
        for the day and be available for cross-checking?
        Something the coders could do in a short time?

        Perhaps changing the "EAN" to the random code, which
        in turn         could be "decoded" to "EAN" at the machine would
        be a combination of both approaches??

        Those alone would solve 99% of all potential "hacks"
        into the system. Short of putting a lock box around
        all machines, someone who will do anything to get
        control could still get in somewhere.