[EAS] Where does the NWS come in?

Mike McCarthy towers at mre.com
Thu Nov 10 07:13:53 CST 2011


We need to remind ourselves of one simple tenet:  EAS is a standardized 
protocol announcing tool to warn of an impending event.  A means to 
increase situational awareness. As Warren Shulz says, a "door bell"  I 
call EAS a "call to action". Whether the future is 10 seconds or 10 
minutes is immaterial. The message is going out ***before*** occurrence. 
EAS the tool itself is ***not*** the problem.  Everything around EAS 
contains them which then gets unfairly attributed to EAS.

Someone made the comment about the NWS not able to carry live voice 
messages.  Well...Baloney.  It can't at present by choice. While the NWS 
doesn't have ENDECs in the conventional sense, their local WFO equipment 
is already programmed to forward messages which "originate" within it's 
secure network.  Their challenge resides in sending/relaying live voice 
content.  Again, that's also solvable.

There are so many reasons at all layers to bring the NWS into the mix as 
an equal partner in distribution.  Very few areas are not already served 
by a NWS radio transmitter.  And those areas also tend to be the least 
populated or visited locations in the country if not the world.  The 
0.00001% of the population.  The one person or family in a 10 sq. mile area.

I find FEMA's use of a customized POTS line conference bridge beyond 
troubling.  Who's bright idea was that?  Where was the satellite system 
for the PEP stations?  Why can't that be used to send the alert to the 
42 or so destinations beyond the PEP stations? Where is the DoD in all 
of this? Get some statutory empowered engineering type people involved 
along with a mandate the NWS and DoD collaborate with commercial 
distributors to solve the total distribution problem and make every 
station and cable company head-end an equal partner.  Enough with the 
confusing layers of PEP, LP-1, LP-2, LP et al. stations.

The real underlying problems are the political will to:

1)  Step beyond protecting fiefdoms.

2) Accept that achieving the goal of making the entire system ultimately 
servivable is unsustainable.  There are simply too many scenarios to 
plan for and as a result over-complicating the system.  The areas which 
need attention and hardening is the so called "last mile" to the last 
point of distribution to the public.

3) Eliminate the daisy chain relay system for national and state 
messages and make every station and cable head-end an equal partner in 
the distribution process using secure satellite distribution through 
NPR, one of the commercial networks, and/or DoD satellite.  Except for a 
small handful of radio stations, every commercial station looks at 
either WW1, Dial-Global, ABC, and/or CCS/Premier.  Plus there is NPR, 
EMF, Moody Bible and other self contained networks of stations and 
translators.

4 )Come to the realization that in a scenario which the PODUS must 
address the nation on short notice, the system can't rely on people to 
make that happen. Distribution must be simplified, automated, and 
repeatably tested end to end.  Think PEP on steroids.

5) Assert to licensees (both terrestrial and satellite) that the license 
they're issued is a privilege, contains specific obligations of which 
EAS is one of them, and assert to government agencies use will be 
deliberate, consistent and not arbitrary.  Blowing the whistle for dust 
devil will have consequences.

6) Accept the reality EAS is not a big deal in DC at present.  It's a 
hair on the dog's tail.

Soap box off...



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